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1 Introduction
Given the recent and common trends of growing disparity in income and wealth
and the increase in poverty among advanced countries, the issue of the long-run
distributional feature of wealth and income in the capitalist economy should
be at the heart of economic analysis, as Piketty (2014) emphasizes. Piketty
(2014) also suggests that divergence in the distribution of wealth and income
is explained by the significant inequality between the earnings rate of financial
assets and the growth rate, since the former represents the increase in rewards for
capital holders while the latter does the increase of the real wage rate. Although
controversial, his argument reminds us of Marx’s view of the capitalist economy
as a conflicting distributional relationship between capitalists and workers.
Marx recognized the conflicting distributional relationship as exploitative,
and argued that an exploitative relation between capitalists and workers is
generic and persistent in the capitalist economy. Since then, the notion of ex-
ploitation has been one of the prominent concepts relevant to capitalist economic
systems, particularly in a number of debates and analyses of labor relations, es-
pecially focusing on the weakest segments of the labor force (see, e.g., ILO,
2005a,b).
However, the nature of exploitation in the capitalist economy is unclear,
while it is a matter of observation that feudal lords exploit serfs in the feudal
system in that the serf spends part of his/her time working for him/herself and
another part on uncompensated work for the lord. Marx argued that a wage
worker is also forced to give up part of his/her life to the capitalist. That is,
while the serf must work for the lord according to feudal law and usage, the
relationship between capitalists and workers is mediated by a market contract
that the worker is formally free not to enter. Nonetheless, the worker cannot
but spend part of his/her time working for a given capitalist by entering into a
contract, since otherwise he/she could not procure his/her necessities because
of a lack of access to means of production.
Given these background arguments, the unequal exchange of labor (UE)
may well be considered as a descriptive feature of exploitation in the capitalist
economy, in that exploitative relations involve systematic differences between
the amount of labor that individuals contribute to the economy in some relevant
sense and the amount of labor they receive in some relevant sense through
their income. Exploitation as UE (hereafter, UE exploitation) may also have
some normative features relevant to a diagnosis of the capitalist economy. For
instance, it captures certain inequalities in the distribution of material well-
being and free hours1 that are –at least prima facie– of normative relevance.
Indeed, they are relevant for the inequalities of well-being freedom as discussed
by Rawls (1971) and Sen (1985) because material well-being and free hours
are two key determinants of individual well-being freedom.2 Second, an UE
1See Fleurbaey (2014) for this point.
2The notion of well-being freedom emphasizes an individual’s ability to pursue the life
he/she values. According to Rawls—Sen theory, inequalities in the distribution of well-being
freedom are formulated as inequalities of capabilities, whereas they are formulated as inequal-
2
exploitation-free allocation coincides with the so-called proportional solution, a
well-known fair allocation rule whereby every agent’s income is proportional to
his/her contribution to the economy (Roemer and Silvestre, 1993).
Although the notion of UE exploitation seems to be intuitive, the application
of this notion to the capitalist economy involves a fundamental difficulty: unlike
the case of feudal exploitation, the division of a worker’s labor into working for
him/herself and working for a capitalist is not a matter of observation since the
market contract between buyers and sellers of labor power is simply observed
as an equal exchange of labor. Therefore, the existence of UE due to the ex-
ploitative relationship in the capitalist economy should be measured through
economic analysis. To promote such an analysis, one of the central issues in
exploitation theory is to stipulate a suitable operational method to measure the
difference between the labor expended and the labor received by an individual
via his/her income, without which we cannot credibly diagnose the capitalist
economy as an exploitative economic system.
As such a measure, Okishio (1963) provides a formal definition of exploitation
to diagnose the capitalist economy as an exploitative economic system under the
so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem (FMT). Although Okishio’s (1963)
definition of exploitation is essentially faithful to the classical labor theory of
value and theory of surplus value, it intrinsically relies on the assumption of two-
class economies with simple Leontief production technology, homogeneous labor,
and homogeneous preferences for consumption and leisure. Indeed, outside of
these simple economies, the appropriate definition of the labor “contributed to”
and “received by” agents is no longer obvious; moreover, the core diagnoses of
the capitalist economy such as the FMT no longer hold under Okishio’s (1963)
definition of UE exploitation, which has led to several proposals for alternative
definitions.
This report examines the development of exploitation theory since the con-
tribution of Okishio (1963) by reviewing the main controversies regarding the
proper formal definition of UE exploitation.3 In the first place, assuming ho-
mogeneous labor and homogeneous preferences for consumption and leisure,
we review Okishio’s definition of exploitation and its generalized versions such
as Morishima (1974) and Roemer (1982) through a debate on the FMT in
economies with more general production technology. Given that the FMT holds
with Okishio’s (1963) definition in economies with simple Leontief production
technology, if the FMT with any generalization of this definition is not preserved
under more general production technology, this would suggest the incoherence
of such a definition rather than the limitation of the basic Marxian perception
of capitalist economies as exploitative. Indeed, it seems to be plausible to think
that a purely technological matter such as the complexity of production tech-
nology should not be essential to determine the position of each agent in the
ities of (comprehensive) resources in Dworkin’s (2000) theory.
3Because of this limited purpose, we mainly refer to the literature relevant to the proper
formal definition of UE exploitation in mathematical Marxian economics, although many other
influential works exist in that field such as the “macro-monetary” approach of Fred Moseley
and the “temporal single-system” framework of Andrew Kliman and others.
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exploitative relation. Similarly, we also discuss the validity of alternative gen-
eralizations of Okishio’s (1963) definition from the viewpoint of the so-called
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP), which was first shown
by Roemer (1982) by using Okishio’s (1963) definition in economies with simple
Leontief production technology. We summarize these arguments and suggest
the limitation and noneligibility of these classical definitions.
Second, we review the property relation definition of exploitation (PR ex-
ploitation), proposed by Roemer (1982, 1994) as an alternative to UE exploita-
tion. Again assuming homogeneous labor and identical preferences for consump-
tion and leisure, the definition of PR exploitation is a mathematical extension
of Okishio’s definition. Moreover, it is generally true that under this definition,
the capitalist economy can be conceived of as exploitative. However, the PR
theory of exploitation denies the relevance of exploitation as a primary norma-
tive concern: Roemer (1994) argues that the primary normative concern should
be the injustice of the unequal distribution of productive assets rather than UE
exploitation per se. Given this criticism of the notion of UE exploitation, we
also review some arguments in political philosophy and sociology such as those
proposed by Cohen (1995), Wright (2000), and Vrousalis (2013), which criti-
cize the PR theory of exploitation and encourage the revival of the UE theory
of exploitation. Based on their arguments, Roemer’s claim that the theory of
exploitation is reduced to a theory of distributive injustice can be invalidated.
Third, allowing heterogeneous labor skills, heterogeneous preferences for con-
sumption and leisure, and general production technology, we review the recent
development of an axiomatic theory of exploitation. Among the works of this
approach, this report focuses on the Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Prin-
ciple (PECP) (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a). Then, an extension of the
exploitation form à la the New Interpretation (NI) originally introduced by
Duménil (1980) and Foley (1982) is shown to be uniquely eligible among the
main definitions provided in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
robustness and economic implications of the debates on the FMT initiated by
Okishio (1963) and developed mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a
discussion of the CECP. Section 3 introduces the criticism of UE exploitation
from the standpoint of PR exploitation, and section 4 provides the counter-
arguments to PR exploitation by Cohen (1995), Wright (2000), and Vrousalis
(2013). Section 5 provides an overview of recent axiomatic studies of exploita-
tion. Finally, section 6 concludes the report and provides a perspective on the
remaining subjects of exploitation theory.
2 Themain developments in mathematical Marx-
ian economics from the 1970s until the 1990s
In this section, we provide an overview of the main arguments regarding a
proper definition of exploitation in mathematical Marxian economics developed
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until the 1990s. We begin with the significant contribution by Nobuo Okishio,
known for the Fundamental Marxian Theorem, and then discuss the successive
developments and relevant debates on this theorem, mainly initiated by Michio
Morishima and John Roemer during the 1970s and 1980s.
2.1 The formulation of labor exploitation by Okishio and
the Fundamental Marxian Theorem
An economy comprises a set of agents, N = {1, .., N}, with generic element
ν ∈ N .4 Denote the cardinal number of this set by N . Similarly, the cardinal
number for any subset, S ⊆ N , is denoted by S. There are n types of (purely
private) commodities that are transferable in markets.
Production technology, commonly accessible by any agent, is represented
by a production possibility set P ⊆ R− × Rn− × Rn+ with generic element
α ≡ (−αl,−α,α), where αl ∈ R+ is the effective labor input; α ∈ Rn+ are the
inputs of the produced goods; and α ∈ Rn+ are the outputs of the n goods. The
net output vector arising from α is denoted as bα ≡ α− α. P is assumed to be
closed and convex-cone such that (i) 0 ∈ P ; (ii) for any α ∈ P with α ≥ 0, αl > 0
holds; and (iii) for any c ∈ Rn+ , there exists α ∈ P such that bα = c. Property
(ii) implies that labor is indispensable for the production of a positive amount
of a commodity, while property (iii) implies that any non-negative vector of
commodities can be produced as a net output. A specific type of production
technology P is of a Leontief type if there exists a pair (A,L), where A is an
n×n non-negative square matrix of material input coefficients and L is a 1×n
positive vector of labor input coefficients, such that P is represented by the
following form:
P(A,L) ≡
©
α ≡ (−αl,−α,α) ∈ R− ×Rn− ×Rn+ | ∃x ∈ Rn+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax, x)
ª
.
Here, A is assumed to be productive and indecomposable. Another specific type
of production technology P is of a von Neumann type if there exists a profile
(A,B,L) such that P is represented by the following form:
P(A,B,L) ≡
©
α ≡ (−αl,−α,α) ∈ R− ×Rn− ×Rn+ | ∃x ∈ Rm+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
where A is an n×m matrix, the generic component of which, aij = 0, represents
the amount of commodity i used as an input to operate one unit of the j-th
production process; B is an n×m matrix, the generic component of which, bij =
0, represents the amount of commodity i produced as an output by operating
one unit of the j-th production process; and L is a 1 ×m positive row vector
of direct labor input coefficients. In the following discussion, we sometimes use
the notation Ai (resp. Bi) to refer to the i-th row vector of A (resp. B).
4Let R be the set of real numbers and R+ (resp. R− ) the set of non-negative (resp. non-
positive) real numbers. For all x, y ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . , n); x ≥ y
if and only if x = y and x 6= y; and x > y if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , n). For any set,
X and Y , X ⊆ Y if and only if for any x ∈ X, x ∈ Y ; X = Y if and only if X ⊆ Y and
Y ⊆ X; and X ( Y if and only if X ⊆ Y and X 6= Y .
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In this and the next sections, assume that for each production period, the
maximal amount of labor supply by every agent is equal to unity and there is
no difference in labor skills (human capital) among agents. Let b ∈ Rn+ be the
basic consumption bundle, which is the minimum consumption necessary for
every agent when supplying one unit of labor. Let ω ∈ Rn+\ {0} be the social
endowments of commodities.
Assuming a private ownership economy, let ων be the initial endowment
of commodities owned by agent ν ∈ N . In the following discussion, let W ≡
{ν ∈ N | ων = 0} be the set of propertyless agents. Typically, W would repre-
sent the set of workers who own no material means of production. In summary,
one capitalist economy is described by a profile
­
N ;P ; (ων)ν∈N
®
.
Given a capitalist economy
­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
, let v represent a vector of
each commodity’s labor value. Note that, according to classical economics and
Marx, the labor value of commodity i, vi, is defined as the sum of the amount
of labor directly and/or indirectly input to produce one unit of this commodity.
Therefore, this value is mathematically formulated by the solution of the system
of equations, v = vA + L. Here, since matrix A is productive and vector L is
positive, v ∈ Rn++ is the unique solution of the system of equations. Then, the
labor value of any commodity vector c ∈ Rn+ is given by vc = 0.
Let w ∈ R+ represent a wage rate. Assume that any agent, ν ∈ W, can
purchase the consumption vector, b, with wage revenue, w, per working day.
Moreover, let p ∈ Rn+\ {0} represent a vector of market prices for n types of
commodities. Then:
Definition 1: A balanced-growth equilibrium (BGE) for a capitalist economy­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
is a profile (p,w) ∈ Rn+1+ \ {0} that satisfies the following:
p = (1 + π) [pA+ wL] & w = pb,
where the scalar π = 0 represents the equal profit rate.5
Definition 2 (Okishio, 1963): In a capitalist economy
­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
,
labor exploitation exists if and only if vb < 1.
That is, within one working day, normalized to unity, vb corresponds to the
necessary labor hours for each ν ∈ W, so that 1 − vb represents the surplus
labor hours. Therefore, the existence of labor exploitation is none other than
the existence of positive surplus labor.
Under Definition 2, Okishio proves the validity of the basic Marxian view,
which conceives the capitalist economy as exploitative, as the following theorem
shows:
5The condition of w = pb means that the wage rate is so low that any propertyless agent
cannot but expend all of the wage revenue for the basic consumption bundle, which corre-
sponds to the case where the aggregate labor supply is excessive with respect to the aggregate
labor demand in the equilibrium.
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Fundamental Marxian Theorem (FMT) (Okishio, 1963): Let (p,w) be a
BGE associated with an equal profit rate π for capitalist economy
­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
.
Then,
π > 0⇔ vb < 1.
Since Okishio (1963), numerous studies have examined the robustness of the
FMT. Of these, we review the works of Morishima (1974) and Roemer (1980),
which discuss the generalization of the FMT to a model of the von Neumann
type, in order to show the robustness of the FMT in economies with fixed capital,
joint production, and the possibility of technical choices.6
Let xj = 0 represent an activity level of the j-th production process, so
that a profile of social production activities is represented by a non-negative
m× 1 column vector, x ≡ (xj)j=1,...,m. For a von Neumann capitalist economy,­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
, we can respectively define the notions of BGEs, labor
values, and labor exploitation as follows:
Definition 3: A balanced-growth equilibrium (BGE) for a capitalist econ-
omy
­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
is a profile of non-negative and non-zero vectors,
((p,w) , x) ∈ Rn+1+ ×Rm+ , that satisfy the following:
pB 5 (1 + π) [pA+ wL] ; Bx = (1 + π) [A+ bL]x; pBx > 0; & w = pb.
Definition 4 (Morishima, 1974): Given a capitalist economy,
­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
,
the labor value of a consumption bundle, c ∈ Rn+, is the solution, Lxc, of the
following constrained optimization program:
min
x=0
Lx s.t. [B −A]x = c.
Then, labor exploitation is said to exist if and only if Lxb < 1.
Definition 4 extends Definition 2 into von Neumann capitalist economies.
Morishima (1974) shows that, under the BGE, the equivalence between the
existence of labor exploitation and a positive equal profit rate is preserved, even
in a von Neumann capitalist economy:
Generalized Fundamental Marxian Theorem (GFMT) (Morishima, 1974):
Let ((p,w) , x) be a BGE associated with the equal profit rate, π, for capitalist
economy
­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
. Then,
π > 0⇔ Lxb < 1.
6Note that generalizations of the FMT to a Leontief economy with heterogeneous labor
have also been examined by Morishima (1973), Bowles and Gintis (1977, 1978), and Krause
(1981). This line of research focuses on solving the reduction problem of heterogeneous labor
into one common unit, and/or the dilemma of the heterogeneity of labor and the respective
rates of exploitation. Thus far, the robustness of the FMT in this line of generalization has
remained firm.
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By contrast, Roemer (1980) defines an alternative equilibrium notion, called
a reproducible solution, which is to preserve its coherency with the profit-maximizing
behavior of every capital owner, ν ∈ N\W. He then examines the robustness
of the FMT under this equilibrium. That is,
Definition 5 (Roemer, 1980): A reproducible solution (RS) for a capitalist
economy
­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
is a profile of non-negative and non-zero vec-
tors, ((p∗, w∗) , x∗) ∈ Rn+1+ ×Rm+ , that satisfies the following:7
(a) xν∗ ∈ argmaxxν=0 p∗Bxν+(p∗ων − [p∗A+ w∗L]xν), such that [p∗A+ w∗L]xν 5
p∗ων (∀ν ∈ N\W), where x∗ ≡Pν∈N\W xν∗;
(b) (B − [A+ bL])x∗ + ω = ω;
(c) w∗ = p∗b;
(d) [A+ bL]x∗ 5 ω.
In this definition, (a) requires that every capital owner maximizes the monetary
value of her capital for the next period, given the equilibrium price vector; (b)
requires the reproducibility of the economy itself, in that the aggregate capital
stock at the beginning of the next period, (B − [A+ bL])x∗ + ω, is at least as
much as that at the beginning of the present period, ω;8 (c) stipulates the labor
market equilibrium; (d) is the feasibility condition of social production. An RS
is a Walrasian equilibrium with an additional condition of the reproducibility.
Roemer’s Fundamental Marxian Theorem (RFMT) (Roemer, 1980): For
any capitalist economy,
­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
, and any RS, ((p∗, w∗) , x∗), the
following two statements are equivalent:
(1) p∗ [B −A]x∗ − w∗Lx∗ > 0⇔ Lxb < 1;
(2) ∀x, x0 = 0, Lx = Lx0, [∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (Bi −Ai)x > (Bi −Ai)x0]⇒ ∃x00 =
0 : Lx00 = Lx0, (Bi −Ai)x00 = (Bi −Ai)x0, & ∃i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (Bi0 −Ai0)x00 >
(Bi0 −Ai0)x.
In the above theorem, statement (1) implies the equivalence between the pos-
itivity of total profit, p∗ [B −A]x∗−w∗Lx∗, at the RS and the existence of labor
exploitation in terms of Definition 4. By contrast, statement (2) characterizes
the necessary and sufficient condition for statement (1) to hold. Suppose two
production activities, say x and x0, have the same corresponding labor inputs.
Then, according to statement (2), if the net output of some commodity, say i,
via activity x is strictly greater than that via activity x0, then there is another
commodity, say i0, such that the net output of i0 via some suitable production
7As Roemer (1980) explicitly shows, there is essentially no difference between the BGE
(given in Definition 1) and the RS in capitalist economies with Leontief production technology.
However, these two notions of equilibria differ whenever a more general model of capitalist
economies is considered.
8As Roemer (1980, p.507) states, “What equilibrium or solution concept is adopted in
Marxian-Sraffian analysis? The concern is with whether the economic system can reproduce
itself: whether it can produce enough output to replenish the inputs used, and to reproduce
the workers for another period of work.”
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activity x00, which may be identical to or different from x0, is strictly greater
than that via x. This statement is named the independence of production by
Roemer (1980). If it fails, there is a commodity that can be produced only as a
joint product in fixed proportions with another commodity. Thus, the RFMT
implies that, in any capitalist economy, the equivalence relationship between
positive profits and the existence of labor exploitation holds for any RS if and
only if no commodity is produced only as a joint product of another good (in
terms of condition (2)) in this economy.
To see the difference between the GFMT and RFMT, consider the following
example.
Example 1: Consider a von Neumann economy,
­
N ;P(A,B,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
, such
that
A =
∙
1 1
1 0
¸
, B =
∙
2 3
2 1
¸
, L = (1, 1) , b =
∙
1
1
¸
, and ω =
∙
2
1
¸
.
In this economy, condition (2) of the RFMT is violated, because B − A =∙
1 2
1 1
¸
and L = (1, 1), which implies that while the second production process
is superior to the first production process in the production of commodity 1, no
production process is superior to the second production process in the produc-
tion of commodity 2.
Note that in this economy, the set of BGEs is characterized by©
((p,w) , x) ∈ {((0, 1) , 1)} ×R2+ | x 6= 0
ª
,
where all BGEs are associated with π = 0. By contrast, the set of RSs is
characterized by½
((p∗, w∗) , x∗) ∈ R2+ × {1} ×
½∙
0
1
¸¾
| p∗1 + p
∗
2 = 1
¾
,
where, if p∗1 > 0, then π∗ =
p∗1
2p∗
1
+p∗
2
> 0; while, if p∗1 = 0, then π∗ = 0.
Next, in this economy, the labor value of the commodity bundle b is Lxb = 1,
where xb is any non-negative vector satisfying xb1 + x
b
2 = 1. Thus, according to
Definition 5, there is no exploitation in this economy.
Therefore, the GFMT holds in this economy, since in any BGE, the cor-
responding profit rate is π = 0, while there is no exploitation. However, we
can find an RS ((p∗, w∗) , x∗), with p∗1 > 0, whose corresponding profit rate is
π∗ > 0. Thus, if the economy arrives at this equilibrium, then positive profits
are generated in conjunction with no exploitation, which violates condition (1)
of the RFMT. This contrast between the GFMT and RFMT can be observed
when the economy does not satisfy condition (2) of the RFMT.
Okishio—Morishima’s proposal for the formulation of labor exploitation given
in Definitions 2 and 4 is consistent with the basic perception of the labor theory
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of value, since it is formulated completely independently of price information.
Given this formulation, however, Example 1 suggests that the equivalence be-
tween positive profits and the existence of exploitation no longer holds for RSs
in a general economic environment with the possibility of fixed capital, joint
production, and technical choices. Firstly, the extension of the equilibrium
notion from the BGE to the RS seems to be reasonable whenever we view a
capitalist economy as a resource allocation mechanism working via the capital-
ists’ profit-seeking motivation under market competition. Secondly, there is no
reason to eliminate such an economy as in Example 1 from the subject of our
analysis. However, this negative result may suggest that Okishio—Morishima’s
definition of labor exploitation is inappropriate rather than that the basic Marx-
ian perception of the capitalist economy as exploitative is not confirmed, since
it seems strange that such a purely technological condition as the existence of
a non-independently produced commodity makes the capitalist economy non-
exploitative.
There is another, even more serious criticism of Okishio—Morishima’s defini-
tion, given by Bowles and Gintis (1981), Roemer (1982), and Samuelson (1982).
To see this, we return to a Leontief capitalist economy,
­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
.
Then, take any commodity, k, and let v
(k)
i , for each commodity i, be the aggre-
gate amount of commodity k directly and/or indirectly input to produce one
unit of the commodity i. Let v(k) ≡
³
v
(k)
i
´
i∈{1,...,n}
be a vector of commodity
k-values. Analogical to the case of the vector of labor values, v(k) can be defined
as the solution of the following system of equations:
v(k) = v(k) [A+ bL] +
³
1− v(k)k
´
[Ak + bkL] ,
where Ak is the k-th row vector of matrix A. Then,
Definition 6: In a capitalist economy,
­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
, the exploitation
of commodity k exists if and only if v
(k)
k < 1.
Generalized Commodity Exploitation Theorem (GCET) (Bowles and
Gintis, 1981; Roemer, 1982; Samuelson, 1982): Let (p,w) be a BGE associated
with the equal profit rate, π, for capitalist economy
­
N ;P(A,L); (ων)ν∈N
®
. Then,
π > 0⇔ vb < 1⇔ v(k)k < 1.
Establishing the GCET leads us to see Okishio—Morishima’s definition of
labor exploitation as representing the productiveness of an overall economic
system. This is because the existence of commodity k’s exploitation is the
exact numerical representation of the productiveness of an overall economic
system if we select commodity k as the numéraire, in that the overall economic
system is productive enough to guarantee the possibility of surplus products
via the efficient use of commodity k as a factor of production. Analogically, we
can interpret the existence of labor exploitation in terms of Definition 2 as the
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numerical representation of the productiveness of an overall economic system by
selecting labor as the numéraire. Therefore, the equivalence between the FMT
and GCET indicates that the necessary and sufficient condition for positive
profits is that the whole economic system is sufficiently productive to guarantee
the possibility of surplus products, which is a trivial proposition. This view
prompted criticism of Okishio’s original motivation and interpretation of the
FMT, in that it may simply affirm the productiveness of the capitalist economy,
rather than the Marxian perception of the capitalist economy as an exploitative
system.9 However, the criticism should be directed to the suitability of Okishio—
Morishima’s formulation, since such a definition fails to present the intrinsic
feature of UE exploitation, which should not be reduced to the productiveness
of an overall economic system.
2.2 Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
Although the FMT has been criticized as mentioned above, there is another well-
known analysis to validate the Marxian perception of the capitalist economy as
an exploitative system: that is, the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
(CECP) proposed by Roemer (1982).
2.2.1 A general model
We first set up a more general economic model than that presented in section
2.1 and its corresponding equilibrium notion. These settings are also used in
section 5.
Given N and P defined in section 2.1, agents can be heterogeneous in terms
of their capital endowments (ωνt )ν∈N in each period t. Moreover, for each ν ∈ N ,
sν > 0 represents his/her skill level. Let C ⊆ Rn+ × [0, 1] be the consumption
space common to all agents, and for each ν ∈ N , let uν : C → R+ be his/her
welfare function. All available welfare functions are assumed to be strongly
increasing in consumption bundles and decreasing in the supply of labor hours.
Thus, one capitalist economy is defined by the list E ≡
­
N ;P ; (uν , sν ,ων0)ν∈N
®
.
As in Roemer (1980, 1982), the time structure of production is explicitly
considered and production activities are financed with current wealth. Agent ν’s
wealth, at the beginning of period t, is given by pt−1ωνt : this is fixed at the end of
period t−1 given market prices pt−1. Thus, given a price system h{pt−1, pt} , wti
in period t, each agent ν ∈ N engages in an optimal choice of production plan
ανt ∈ P . Here, each agent (i) purchases a bundle of capital goods ανt at price
pt−1 under his/her wealth constraint, pt−1ωνt , and employs labor power, ανlt, at
the beginning of this period; (ii) purchases an optimal amount of commodity
9For a more detailed discussion on the implications of the GCET, see Roemer (1982) and
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2010a, b). Studies such as Fujimoto and Fujita (2008) and Matsuo
(2009) criticize the GCET, supporting Okishio—Morishima’s definition of labor exploitation.
Such critics emphasize that the coefficients L and b are not simply technologically determined
but reflect the state of class struggle. This point is true, but it does not deny that Okishio—
Morishima’s definition is mainly used to represent the productiveness of an overall economic
system.
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bundle δνt at price pt−1 under budget constraint pt−1 (ωνt − ανt ) for speculative
purposes, to be sold at the end of the period with an expected price pt; and (iii)
chooses an optimal labor supply and consumption plan, (cνt , l
ν
t ) ∈ C, where cνt
will be purchased at the end of this period with an expected price (pt, wt) under
the budget constraint of his/her revenue from both production and speculation.
This choice behavior is determined as a solution to the optimization problem
(MP νt ), as follows:
MP νt : max
(cνt ,l
ν
t )∈C; δνt∈Rn+ ; ανt∈P
uν (cνt , l
ν
t )
s.t. [ptανt − wtανlt] + wtΛνt + ptδνt = ptcνt + ptωνt+1, where Λνt ≡ sν lνt ;
pt−1δνt + pt−1ανt 5 pt−1ωνt ;
ptωνt+1 = pt−1ωνt .
Then, denote the set of solutions to the problem (MP νt ) by O
ν
t ({pt−1, pt} , wt).
We focus on the stationary equilibrium price vector, p∗ = pt−1 = pt (∀t).
Moreover, we focus on the non-trivial equilibrium satisfying π ≡ maxα0∈P p
∗α0−p∗α0−wtα0l
p∗α0 =
0. In this case, according to the monotone increasing characteristic of uν at cνt ,
there always exists an optimal solution having δνt = 0. By focusing on this
optimal solution, we can remove the description of δνt without loss of generality.
Therefore, we consider the following equilibrium notion:
Definition 7: For a capitalist economy, E, a reproducible solution (RS) is a
profile
¡
(p∗, w∗t ) ; ((c
∗ν
t , l
∗ν
t ) ;α∗νt )ν∈N
¢
of a price system and economic activities
in each period, t, satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ((c∗νt , l
∗ν
t ) ;α∗νt ) ∈ Oνt (p∗, w∗t ) (∀t) (each agent’s optimization);
(ii)
P
ν∈N bα∗νt = Pν∈N c∗νt (∀t) (demand-supply matching at the end of each
period);
(iii)
P
ν∈N α∗νlt =
P
ν∈N Λ∗νt (∀t) (labor market equilibrium);
(iv)
P
ν∈N α∗νt 5
P
ν∈N ωνt (∀t) (social feasibility of production at the beginning
of each period).
Henceforth, we assume the stationary state on economic activities of agents
and delete the time description, t.
2.2.2 Class and exploitation
Although the above definitions of MP νt and the RS are the most general, let
us focus on a specific case of such a general form of capitalist economies within
this subsection. First, we assume that all agents have the same level of skill,
so that sν = 1 for each ν ∈ N , without loss of generality. Therefore, Λνt =
lνt holds for each ν ∈ N . Second, we focus on the following case: for each
ν ∈ N , uν (c, l) ≡ ψν (c). That is, all agents are indifferent to the increase in
leisure. In this case, for any economy E =
­
N ;P ; (ψν , 1,ων)ν∈N
®
and any RS
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¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, lν = 1 and pcν = πpων +w hold for any ν ∈ N . Let
Πν (p,w) ≡ πpων + w be the net revenue of ν ∈ N at RS-prices (p,w).
Based on Roemer (1982), we define the class structure of the capitalist econ-
omy as follows:
Definition 8: For a capitalist economy, E =
­
N ;P ; (ψν , 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, let
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , 1) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
be an RS. Then, for each ν ∈ N :
(i) ν is a member of the capitalist class, C1(⊆ N ) if and only if ανl > 1;
(ii) ν is a member of the petit bourgeois class, C2(⊆ N ) if and only if ανl = 1;
(iii) ν is a member of the quasi-proletariat class, C3(⊆ N ) if and only if ανl < 1;
and
(iv) ν is a member of the pure proletariat class, C4(⊆ N ) if and only if ανl = 0.
Under this definition, ανl > 1 implies that agent ν should employ others’ labor
in the equilibrium, meaning that such an agent is an employer; ανl = 1 implies
that agent ν should be self-employed in the equilibrium; and ανl < 1 implies
that agent ν could spend a part of his/her labor in his/her own shop but must
sell his/her remaining labor to others. Finally, ανl = 0 implies that this agent
can optimize only by selling all of his/her labor to others.
Based on Okishio—Morishima’s definition of exploitation, Roemer (1982) pro-
vides a more comprehensive definition of exploitative relations as follows. First,
for any bundle c ∈ Rn+ , let us denote the production possibility set to produce
c as a net output by φ (c) ≡ {α ∈ P | bα = c}. Then:
Definition 9: For a capitalist economy, E =
­
N ;P ; (ψν , 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, let
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , 1) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
be an RS. Then, for each ν ∈ N :
(i) ν is exploited if and only if 1 > maxfν∈Rn
+
: pfν=Πν(p,w)minα∈φ(fν) αl;
(ii) ν is an exploiter if and only if 1 < minfν∈Rn
+
: pfν=Πν(p,w)minα∈φ(fν) αl.
Note that when P = P(A,B,L), then αν = (−Lxν ,−Axν , Bxν) and sominα∈φ(fν) αl =
Lxf
ν
, where Lxf
ν
is given by Definition 4. Likewise, when P = P(A,L), then
αν = (−Lxν ,−Axν , xν) and so minα∈φ(fν) αl = vfν .
Given these formulations of class structure and exploitation, Roemer (1982)
shows the following:
Theorem of the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP):
For any E =
­
N ;P(A,L); (ψν , 1,ων)ν∈N
®
and any RS
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , 1) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
with π > 0,
(i) every agent ν ∈ C1 is an exploiter;
(ii) every agent ν ∈ C3 ∪ C4 is exploited; and
(iii) for any k = 1, 2, 3 and any ν ∈ Ck and any μ ∈ Ck+1, pων > pωμ holds.
Given Okishio—Morishima’s definition of exploitation, the CECP establishes
that for any capitalist economy with Leontief production technology and any RS
with a positive maximal profit rate, every member of the capitalist class C1 is an
exploiter while every member of the working class C3∪C4 is exploited. Moreover,
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every member of the capitalist class is richer than every member of the working
class. This states that in the equilibrium class membership and exploitation
status emerge endogenously: the wealthy can rationally choose to belong to the
capitalist class among other available options and become an exploiter, while
the poor have no other option than being in the working class and are exploited.
Thus, it provides a more comprehensive analysis of the capitalist economy as
an exploitative system than the FMT, since the latter is only concerned with
the (average rate) of exploitation for propertyless agents in W.
Unfortunately, as in the case of the FMT, the robustness of the CECP is
also problematic if a more general production technology is considered: given
Definition 9, the CECP does not hold in an economy with P(A,B,L). This finding
can be confirmed by checking the economy presented in Example 1.10 From
Definition 8(iv), any agent in W belongs to C4. Therefore, to verify the CECP,
such an agent must be exploited in terms of Definition 9(i). However, in Example
1, at an RS (p∗, w∗) with p∗1 > 0 and w
∗ > 0, p∗b = Πν (p∗, w∗) holds for any
ν ∈W, and Lxb = 1. Therefore, since maxfν∈Rn
+
: p∗fν=Πν(p∗,w∗) Lx
fν = Lxb =
1 for any ν ∈ W, no agent in C4 is exploited. This means the violation of the
CECP.
Given this negative result, Roemer (1982, chapter 5) rightly argues that this
is the most serious criticism of Okishio—Morishima’s definition of exploitation,
rather than the failure of the basic Marxian perception of the capitalist economy
as an exploitative system. This is because, taking the CECP as a guiding
postulate even though it is a theorem, “we learn something about what the
formal model must look like” (Roemer, 1982, p. 152).
Roemer (1982, chapter 5) also provides an alternative to Okishio—Morishima’s
definition. For any price system (p,w) ∈ Rn+1+ and any c ∈ Rn+ , let φ (c; p,w) ≡n
α ∈ argmaxα0∈P pα
0−wα0l
pα0 | bα = co. Then,
Definition 10: For a capitalist economy, E =
­
N ;P ; (ψν , 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, let
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , 1) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
be an RS. Then, for each ν ∈ N :
(i) ν is exploited if and only if 1 > maxfν∈Rn
+
: pfν=Πν(p,w)minα∈φ(fν ;p,w) αl;
(ii) ν is an exploiter if and only if 1 < minfν∈Rn
+
: pfν=Πν(p,w)minα∈φ(fν ;p,w) αl.
Unlike Definitions 2, 4, and 9, Definition 10 formulates the labor value of
a commodity vector as a function of equilibrium prices. Therefore, it is not
faithful to the labor theory of value. Roemer (1982, chapter 5) claims that
given Definition 10, the CECP holds in the general economy, and relying on this
claim, he also criticizes the labor theory of value, by arguing that to preserve
the CECP, labor values must be properly defined as “logically posterior” to
equilibrium prices.
10Although the economy in Example 1 violates condition (2) of the RFMT, this is not
essential for deriving a negative result. Indeed, as Yoshihara (2010, Corollary 1) explicitly
shows, we can develop essentially the same proof, even for an economy without an inferior
process.
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Unfortunately, his claim is wrong in that, given Definition 10, the CECP still
fails in an economy with P(A,B,L). This point again can be verified by the econ-
omy in Example 1.11 At an RS (p∗, w∗)with p∗1 > 0 and w
∗ > 0, it is verified that
φ (b; p∗, w∗) = {λα∗ | λ = 1} for α∗ ≡ (−Le2,−Ae2, Be2) where e2 ≡
∙
0
1
¸
.
Therefore,minα∈φ(b;p∗,w∗) αl = 1 5 maxfν∈Rn+: p∗fν=w∗ minα∈φ(fν ;p∗,w∗) αl, which
implies that no agent in C4 is exploited in terms of Definition 10. Thus, although
Roemer’s (1982) view about the epistemological role of the CECP is correct, his
proposal about the proper definition of UE exploitation cannot be validated.
3 The property relation definition of exploita-
tion by Roemer (1982)
Roemer (1994) argues that UE exploitation should be replaced with exploitation
as the distributional consequences of an unjust inequality in the distribution of
productive assets and resources. What constitutes unjust inequality in capitalist
societies? Roemer (1994) argues that this is the unequal distribution of alienable
assets.12
Based on this view, Roemer (1994) proposes the property relation definition
of exploitation (PR exploitation). Namely, a group or individual (capitalis-
tically) exploits another group or individual if and only if the following three
conditions hold: (i) were the latter to withdraw from society, endowed with
his/her per capita share of social alienable goods and own labor skill, then
his/her welfare would improve compared with under the present allocation; (ii)
were the former to withdraw under the same conditions, then his/her welfare
would worsen compared with under the present allocation; and (iii) were the
latter to withdraw from society, endowed with his/her own endowments, then
the former would be worse off than at present.
Such a definition can be formulated within the framework of cooperative
game theory. Let (V 1, . . ., V N ) ∈ RN+ be a profile of each agent’s welfare level
in society. Let P (N ) be the power set of N and let K : P (N ) → R+ be a
characteristic function of society, which assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N , with
S agents, an aggregate payoff, K(S), if it withdraws from the economy.
The types of features that characteristic function K would have to include
as a welfare allocation rule of the alternative society depends on the nature of
the alternative society. For instance, in a capitalist society, function K would be
defined in terms of the welfare allocation implementable from the equal distrib-
ution of alienable assets. Consider an economy E =
­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
,
where u is the common welfare function of all agents. Define a feasible allo-
cation for this economy as a profile
¡
(cν , lν)ν∈N , x
¢
∈ CN × Rn+ satisfying (i)
11Again, the violation of condition (2) of the RFMT in the economy in Example 1 is not
essential for this negative result. For this point, see Yoshihara (2010, Corollary 2).
12Alienable assets are typically financial assets and/or material capital goods. By contrast,
inalienable assets are typically talents and/or skills immanent in individuals.
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Ax 5 ω; (ii) Lx =Pν∈N lν ; and (iii) (I −A)x =Pν∈N cν . If a feasible alloca-
tion
¡
(c∗ν , l∗ν)ν∈N , x
∗¢ is implemented as an RS for the capitalist economy E ,
then its corresponding welfare allocation is denoted by (V ∗1, . . ., V ∗N ), where
V ∗ν ≡ u (c∗ν , l∗ν) for each ν ∈ N .
Denote the welfare allocation rule of an alternative society byKCE : P (N )→
R+. For each coalition, S ⊆ N , then consider the following optimization pro-
gram (CE):
max
((cν ,lν)ν∈S ,x)
X
ν∈S
u (cν , lν)
s.t. (I −A)x =
X
ν∈S
cν ; Lx =
X
ν∈S
lν 5 S; & Ax 5
S
N
ω. (CE)
Denote the solution of program (CE) by
¡
(c∗∗ν , l∗∗ν)ν∈S , x
S
¢
. Then, the char-
acteristic function, KCE , is defined by KCE (S) ≡Pν∈S u (c∗∗ν , l∗∗ν) for each
S ⊆ N .
The program (CE) presumes a counterfactual situation in which group S
withdraws from the capitalist society to form a commune comprising the mem-
bers of this group, and then investigates the expected sum of the welfare levels
achievable in that alternative society. That is, the program maximizes the ag-
gregate of the welfare levels attainable by group S endowed with its accessible
aggregate capital stock, S
N
ω. Here, S
N
ω is the sum of the capital stocks of all
members in S derived from the counterfactual equal distribution of the overall
material means of production, ω. The solution to this program constitutes the
value KCE (S) as the total payoff attainable by group S if it forms a commu-
nal society by withdrawing from the present society. Following Roemer (1982),
the property-relation exploitation of a capitalist society (capitalist PR
exploitation) is defined by means of this KCE , as follows:
Definition 11 (Roemer, 1982): At a welfare allocation (V ∗1, . . ., V ∗N ) of a
capitalist economy,
­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, coalition S ⊆ N is capitalisti-
cally exploited (resp. capitalistically exploiting) if and only if the complement
T ≡ N\S is in a relation of dominance to S, and the following two conditions
hold:
(i)
P
ν∈S V
∗ν < KCE(S) (resp.
P
ν∈S V
∗ν > KCE(S));
(ii)
P
ν∈T V
∗ν > KCE(T ) (resp.
P
ν∈T V
∗ν < KCE(T )).
That is, condition (i) of Definition 11 states that a capitalistically exploited
coalition is worse off in terms of its attainable payoff in the capitalist society than
in the communal society endowed with an equal distribution of material means of
production. Moreover, condition (ii) of Definition 11 states that the complement
of the capitalistically exploited coalition would be better off in terms of its
attainable payoff in the capitalist society than in the communal society of this
complement. It would be expected that a capitalistically exploiting coalition
would exist within this complement. In addition to the definition given in
Roemer (1982), Roemer (1994) introduces a third condition: (iii) the aggregate
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welfare of group T would be worse off if group S withdraws, taking ωS ≡P
ν∈S ων with it from the capitalist society.13 This condition would naturally
follow whenever the welfare allocation (V ∗1, . . . , V ∗N ) is derived from the RS
in our setting of the Leontief capitalist economy.
A non-exploitative society in terms of Definition 11 can be formulated as a
society without an unequal distribution of material capital goods, as confirmed
by the following definition.
Definition 12 (Roemer, 1982)]: For any Leontief production economy,
­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
,
a welfare allocation (V ∗1, . . . , V ∗N ) lies in a communal core if and only if any
coalition S ⊆ N is not capitalistically exploited by the allocation.
Definition 12 implies that the core property of a communal society is equivalent
to the non-existence of capitalist exploitation in terms of Definition 11.
What types of feasible allocations can a communal core contain? The welfare
allocation lies in the communal core if (i) it is generated from the situation in
which all individuals in N constitute a communal society, (ii) all individuals
engage in a cooperative production activity using the overall set of material
capital goods, ω, and (iii) all individuals share the reward of the activity equally.
Such an allocation is a non-exploitative allocation in terms of Definition 11.14
Unlike the traditional Marxian theory of exploitation, the capitalist PR ex-
ploitation formulated in Definition 11 never refers to UE. Rather, it straightfor-
wardly refers to the unequal distribution of material means of production as the
basic feature of exploitation in the capitalist economy. However, Definition 11
extends Okishio—Morishima’s definition of UE exploitation, as pointed out by
Roemer (1982). Indeed, given the RS ((p∗, w∗) , x∗) in the capitalist economy­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, if any worker, ν ∈ W, is identified as an exploited
agent by Okishio—Morishima’s definition of exploitation, then he/she would be
a member of an exploited coalition in terms of Definition 11. Furthermore, Def-
inition 11 allows us to identify all exploited agents beyond the members of W as
well as all members of the exploiters. Henceforth, the PR theory of exploitation
provides a finer definition of exploitation than do UE theories. In summary,
13The condition that T is in a relation of dominance to S in Definition 11 is not formally
specified by Roemer (1982). This condition is, firstly, to ensure the existence of economic
interactions between T and S. Secondly, it is to eliminate certain perverse cases such as an
invalid supported with costly medication by the rest of society, who would be worse off and the
rest of society better off after their respective withdrawal according to KCE . Indeed, because
of this dominance condition, the relationship between the invalid and the rest of society is not
exploitative even though Definition 11(i) and Definition 11(ii) are satisfied: they are not in a
relation of dominance (see Roemer (1994, p.21, footnote 4)).
However, the condition of dominance alone may be insufficient to define exploitation. For
instance, as discussed in section 4.9.2, we may say that the European settlers and indigenous
people in North America were in a relation of dominance, but they were not in an exploitative
relation even if Definition 11(i) and Definition 11(ii) were satisfied. In this respect, the third
condition (iii) by Roemer (1994) requests that in order to identify capitalist PR exploitation,
T depends on S in the situation for its fortune to flourish. By adding this condition, the
relationship between the European settlers and indigenous people was not PR exploitative.
14For a more detailed discussion, see Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015b, section 4.4).
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whenever we are interested in exploitation as a feature of social relations, Roe-
mer (1994) concludes that we should discuss it based on the PR definition rather
than the UE definition of exploitation.
Given this alternative definition, Roemer (1994) questions whether the issue
of exploitation is an intrinsic normative problem worth discussing in the con-
text of contemporary societies. He argues that exploitation per se is at best a
morally secondary phenomenon. Instead, he believes that the normatively pri-
mary concern that we should be addressing is the injustice of property relations.
For instance, according to Definition 11, capitalist PR exploitation exists in the
RS ((p∗, w∗) , x∗) of the economy
­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, whenever alienable
capital goods are unequally distributed.15 However, although inequality in the
distribution of alienable resources could be conceived of as unjust when all agents
are homogeneous in their welfare functions and skills, the issue is less straight-
forward when these functions and skills are heterogeneous and diverse. Given
that the heterogeneity and diversity of agents are generic features of contempo-
rary societies, it seems to be necessary for us to develop a more comprehensive
theory of distributive justice, which should be the normatively primary concern
in contemporary societies, rather than the development of exploitation theory.
Therefore, what types of theories of distributive justice should be addressed?
As a solution, Roemer (1994, 1998) develops a theory of equality of opportunity,
based on the debates on equality by Dworkin (2000), Arneson (1989), and Cohen
(1989). His theory can be summarized by the following axiom:
Principle of voluntary disadvantage: The distribution of alienable resources
between any agents, ν ∈ N and ν0 ∈ N , is just if and only if any difference in ν’s
and ν0’s enjoyment of the resources reflects a difference in their choices, desserts,
or faults.
Any inequality violating this principle implies involuntary disadvantage, which
should be deemed to be distributive injustice.
Note that involuntary disadvantage implies disadvantages due to circum-
stantial factors for which individuals should not be deemed to be responsible,
such as those due to household environments, native talents, disaster, and so
on. It is reasonable to regard an agent’s disadvantage in the private owner-
ship of material capital goods as involuntary, at least in his/her initial stage
of economic activities. For instance, in the above-mentioned capitalist economy­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
, there is supposedly no difference in agents’ native tal-
ents, and the possibility of disaster is not considered. Therefore, the inequality
in the private ownership of material capital goods is the sole source of involun-
tary disadvantages in this economy. In this respect, an equilibrium allocation
in the economy
­
N ;P(A,L); (u, 1,ων)ν∈N
®
implies involuntary disadvantages if
and only if it entails capitalist PR exploitation in terms of Definition 11.
In summary, given the above arguments, the existence of exploitation à la
Roemer’s theory of PR exploitation is equivalent to distributive injustice à la
15The additional condition (iii) of capitalist PR exploitation is met under the RS, as men-
tioned above.
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Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity, at least in any Leontief capitalist
economy with no heterogeneity or diversity of agents. Hence, in such homo-
geneous societies, it is sufficient to argue distributive injustice in terms of the
theory of equality of opportunity. Moreover, the theory of equality of oppor-
tunity can diagnose allocations of alienable resources as unjust, even in soci-
eties with heterogeneity and/or diversity among agents. Therefore, the issue
of exploitation can be replaced with, or be reduced to, the issue of distributive
injustice because of the theory of equality of opportunity. It is sufficient that
we diagnose societies using the theory of equal opportunity, which is the main
message derived from Roemer’s PR theory of exploitation in conjunction with
the theory of equality of opportunity.
4 Recent trends of exploitation theory in polit-
ical philosophy and sociology
Roemer’s PR theory of exploitation was so influential that, while the Marxian
theory of exploitation was almost dismissed in economics, given the absence of
substantial studies in this field since Roemer (1994), many counterarguments
were developed, particularly in political philosophy and sociology. Among these,
this section reviews Cohen’s (1995) criticism of PR exploitation and the recent
works of Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000) on reviving UE exploitation theory.
4.1 Cohen’s (1995) criticism of PR exploitation
Cohen (1995) criticizes Roemer’s (1994) claim that normatively fundamental
injustice is the maldistribution of assets rather than their unreciprocated flow
(i.e., the UE transfer of products). Let us consider agents ν and μ, who are equal
in talent and external assets but who have different preferences for income and
leisure in that ν is an idler and μ is a workaholic. Then, ν let μ work on ν’s
means of production after μ has finished working on his own. As a consequence,
a part of μ’s product derived from her working on ν’s means of production goes
to ν. In this case, there is nothing unjust since there is no unjust extraction.
Based on this argument, Roemer concludes that the UE transfer per se
is not unjust and that unequal asset distribution is normatively fundamental
injustice. By contrast, according to Cohen, the injustice of such a distribution
is normatively derivative. Indeed, Cohen (1995) argues that an unreciprocal
transfer of products is unjust if and only if it occurs for the wrong reason.
The transfer is unjust when it is caused not by different preferences but by
an unequal asset endowment. Moreover, an unequal asset endowment is unjust
because of its tendency to induce an unjust product flow. Therefore, although it
is causally primary in the explanation of the possibility and occurrence of unjust
transfers, it remains normatively secondary unjust. Based on this argument, the
UE transfer in the above example is simply not unjustly exploitative.16
16Consider also the case that ν and μ have dissimilar external assets but the same preference
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Note that Cohen (1995) also thinks that taking the UE transfer itself as
coherently unjust and exploitative causes difficulties. The position to regard
the UE transfer as such implicitly affirms at least a strongly qualified version of
the self-ownership principle.17 Such a position cannot criticize cleanly generated
capitalism,18 since such a brand of capitalism was generated without violating
the self-ownership principle.
By contrast, based on Cohen’s (1995) argument, cleanly generated capitalism
can be criticized: even in such a capitalist economy, the worker μ is exploited by
the capitalist ν, since ν gets some of what μ produces (for no return) by virtue
of the differential ownership of means of production. Further, since such asset
inequality causes ν to get some of what μ produces, it is unjust that ν would get
it. Moreover, the unequal distribution of means of production is unjust because
it tends to cause such an unjustly unreciprocal transfer.
4.2 A conceptual definition of Vrousalis (2013) in political
philosophy
Vrousalis (2013) offers the following argument for the conceptual definition of
exploitation in capitalist economies:
Definition 13 (Vrousalis, 2013): Agent ν economically exploits agent μ if and
only if ν and μ are embedded in a systematic relationship in which, (a) ν
instrumentalizes μ’s economic vulnerability to ν in order to (b) appropriate (the
fruits of) μ’s labor.
To clarify this definition, we examine each concept in Definition 12 individu-
ally.19
First, the instrumentalization of a subject implies that the subject is being
used as a means to an end. Note that, according to Vrousalis (2013), neither
unfairness nor the intentionality of instrumentalization is necessary for the de-
finition of exploitation. As we will see, Vrousalis (2013) provides examples of
the “non-unfair” utilization of others’ attributes, which is still deemed to be
for income and leisure. Because of these different endowments, suppose that ν must get less
product than μ for the same labor input if each of them respectively chooses to work autarchi-
cally. Thus, an inequality in income and leisure is derived from unequal asset endowments.
Cohen (1995) acknowledges that this situation is not exploitative, although it does represent
the injustice generated by unequal asset endowments.
17That is, a person should be sovereign with respect to what he/she will do with his/her
energies.
18That is, a form of capitalism in which a capital-lacking worker is on one side and a capital-
endowed capitalist is on the other, that does not arise from “primitive accumulation” through
massacre, plunder, forced extraction, or, more generally, by transgressing some norm of dis-
tributive justice. Rather, it arises from “clean” social interactions: a laborer, starting from
equality of external assets, manages to accumulate significant quantities of capital through
toil and savings, thereby turning him/herself into a capitalist.
19Here, we mainly summarize Vrousalis’s own account without necessarily endorsing it,
although some of his claims may need more careful discussion based on economic theory, as
mentioned in footnote 23.
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exploitative. Vrousalis (2013) also discusses that one can unintentionally or
unknowingly instrumentalize another’s vulnerability and thereby exploit that
person.
Second, before discussing the notion of economic vulnerability, let us men-
tion that Vrousalis (2013) describes two types of vulnerability: absolute and
relational. An agent suffers absolute vulnerability when he/she is at substantial
risk of a significant loss in the relevant metric (welfare, resources, capabilities,
etc.). The absence of absolute vulnerability is guaranteed by security, which im-
plies such losses will not occur. However, absolute vulnerability does not refer
to an agent’s power over another person. By contrast, the notion of relational
vulnerability is defined as follows: μ is relationally vulnerable to ν if ν has some
sort of power over μ in that (i) μ lacks something that he/she wants/needs, F ,
that is a requirement for μ to flourish; (ii) μ can only obtain F from ν; and (iii)
ν has it within his/her discretion to withhold F from μ.20
Now, the notion of economic vulnerability is defined as follows: μ is econom-
ically vulnerable to ν if and only if μ is relationally vulnerable to ν by virtue of
μ’s position relative to ν in the relations of production. Here, it refers to the
systematic relations of effective ownership in that ν’s ownership of a means of
production and μ’s lack thereof (or, μ’s ownership is substantially less than ν’s),
as a result of which ν has economic power over μ in the sense that ν has the
relevant ability and opportunity to get μ to do something by virtue of his/her
control over a greater share of resources than μ.
In summary, if ν instrumentalizes μ’s economic vulnerability to ν, then in
doing so, ν takes advantage of his/her economic power over μ. Under capitalism,
if μ has no means of production but ν does, or μ owns substantially less than ν,
then μ is economically vulnerable to ν. In other words, ν is given economic power
over μ and can get μ to supply his/her labor power to ν. For instance, assuming
an equal distribution of internal resources,21 the wealth owned by capitalists (or
agent ν) systematically gives them a decisive bargaining advantage over workers
(or agent μ), which means capitalists take advantage of their economic power
over workers, but never the other way around.2223
Finally, condition (b) of Definition 13 needs clarification: ν appropriates μ’s
labor when μ toils for H hours, and ν appropriates a use value of H −G hours
20Vrousalis (2013) does not consider condition (iii) of relational vulnerability to be a neces-
sary condition for exploitation, since there is nothing contradictory in the thought that ν is
forced to exploit μ and therefore lacks the said discretion.
21 Internal resources imply talents and/or skills inherent in individuals. By contrast, any
other types of resources that are transferrable are often called external resources. For a more
detailed argument on these concepts, see Cohen (1995).
22Therefore, economic vulnerability in the definition of economic exploitation refers to the
relations of production that must be unilateral in nature as Vrousalis (2013, p. 137) states:
“there can be no “reciprocal” economic power-over: if Bill Gates and Warren Buffett own
approximately the same amount of wealth, then neither power-overs the other economically.”
Note that the general notion of relational vulnerability also allows the case of two parties that
are mutually relationally vulnerable to each other in that one party’s resources are a necessity
of the other and vice versa.
23To logically ensure this claim, we would need to develop a more detailed, step-by-step
argument, based upon economic theory, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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of toil, where G can be any number satisfying H > G = 0.24
In Definition 13, UE, which is represented by condition (b), is simply a
necessary condition for economic exploitation, since conditions (a) and (b) of
Definition 13 together constitute economic exploitation. For instance, gift-giving
implies UE, but no one thinks of (even systematic) gift-giving as exploitative.
If one party freely decides to pass on a large part of whatever use value he/she
creates (with his/her own labor power) to another party of society, the resulting
inequality in the consumption of (surplus) labor need not be objectionable.
4.3 A conceptual definition of exploitation byWright (2000)
in sociology
Wright (2000) defines exploitation as follows:
Definition 14 (Wright, 2000): Exploitation exists if the following three criteria
are satisfied:
(1) The inverse interdependent welfare principle: The material welfare of ex-
ploiters causally depends upon the reduction of the material welfare of the ex-
ploited;
(2) The exclusion principle: This inverse interdependence of the welfare of ex-
ploiters and the exploited depends upon the exclusion of the exploited from
access to certain productive resources; and
(3) The appropriation principle: The exclusion generates a material advantage
to exploiters because it enables them to appropriate the labor effort of the
exploited.
In a market economy, both parties to an exchange gain relative to their con-
dition before making the exchange: both workers and capitalists gain when an
exchange of labor power for a wage occurs. While such mutual gains from trade
can occur, the magnitude of the gain by one party may still be at the expense
of another party.25 Thus, criterion (1) should be satisfied and, according to
24Note that although the notion of economic exploitation only refers to the extraction of
labor, any other form of extraction from the exploited can be argued in the general notion
of exploitation, such as the case of sexual exploitation, which is also discussed by Vrousalis
(2013).
25For this point, Wright (2000, pp. 1566—1567) explains as follows: “Let us examine the
three criteria for exploitation specified above in a capitalist economy with perfect competition
in which there are only two categories of economic actors: capitalists who own the means
of production–and thus have the effective power to exclude others from access to those
assets–and workers who own only their labor power. .... Are the inverse interdependent
welfare principle and the exclusion principle satisfied in this case? Is the material welfare of
capitalists causally dependent upon the exclusion of workers from access to capital assets?
The test here is whether or not it is the case that workers would be better off and capitalists
worse off if property rights were redistributed so that workers would no longer be “excluded”
from capital. It seems hard to argue that this is not the case: in the initial condition capitalists
have a choice of either consuming their capital or investing it, as well as the choice of whether
or not they will work for earnings. Workers only have the latter choice. To be sure, they can
borrow capital (and in a world of perfect information they would not need collateral to do so
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Wright (2000), we should not assume that market exchanges do not satisfy (1)
because of mutual gains from trade.
Wright (2000) argues that exploitation is the process through which certain
inequalities in income are generated by inequalities in rights and powers over
productive resources. Such inequalities in income occur by the ways in which
exploiters, by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers over productive
resources, are able to appropriate the labor effort of the exploited.
Before closing this subsection, it is worth noting that Definition 14 is insuf-
ficient as a definition of exploitation, and nor is it as elaborate a conceptual
configuration as Definition 13. Definition 14 simply lists the indispensable prin-
ciples of exploitation as its essential features, although the three principles are
intuitively appealing and well acknowledged. Moreover, it is easy to check that
Definition 13 satisfies all three principles in Definition 14. Indeed, the appropri-
ation principle is obviously satisfied, and the exclusion principle is satisfied by
the definition of economic vulnerability. Finally, Definition 13 also satisfies the
inverse interdependence welfare principle as long as the fruit of labor is defined
as a use value contributing to human welfare.
4.4 Relations of exploitation with economic oppression
and distributive injustice
This subsection examines the logical relation of exploitation to similar notions of
economic oppression and/or distributive injustice using the conceptual definition
of exploitation developed by Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000).
4.4.1 Exploitation and distributive injustice
Based on the notion of economic exploitation in Definition 13, Roemer’s claim
that the issue of exploitation can be reduced to that of distributive injustice is
not valid. To argue this point, Vrousalis (2013) applies the notion of cleanly
generated capitalism defined in section 4.1 and provides us with the following
example:
Example of Grasshopper and Ant: Grasshopper spends the summer months
singing, whereas Ant spends all her time working. When the winter comes,
Grasshopper needs shelter, which he presently lacks. Ant has three options:
(i) She can do nothing to help Grasshopper, in which case, the corresponding
payoff allocation, (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) is (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) = (10, 1);
(ii) She can offer Grasshopper her own shelter on the condition that he signs a
sweatshop contract to pay the rent, in which case, (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) = (12, 2); and
(iii) She can offer Grasshopper her own shelter rent-free, where the cost of
maintenance is equal to −1, then (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) = (9, 3).
since there would be no transaction costs, no monitoring costs, no possibility of opportunism),
but still workers would be better off owning capital outright than having to borrow it.”
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Now, it is plausible to think that Ant has an obligation to help Grasshopper.
However, one need not have a view on this to believe that (ii) is morally worse
than (iii), in part because the choice of (ii) constitutes exploitation. Indeed,
according to the Roemerian principle of voluntary disadvantages discussed in
the last section, (i), (ii), and (iii) are equally acceptable. This fact implies that
even if it is agreed that option (ii) involves exploitation, it cannot be condemned
as distributive injustice by means of Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity.
The above argument suggests that Roemer’s claim that exploitation implies
distributive injustice cannot be validated as long as Definition 13 is presumed.
The reason why exploitation survives in the absence of distributive injustice is
that, according to Definition 13, the notion of exploitation aims to diagnose the
structure of an economic transaction involving an asymmetric power relation
that systematically generates an unequal exchange of labor. In other words,
exploitation constitutes a procedural injury to status, which is not reducible to
distributive injury.
4.4.2 Exploitation and non-exploitative economic oppression
Exploitation is nothing but a category of economic oppression. Generally speak-
ing, economic oppression could be conceived of as social relations satisfying the
inverse interdependence welfare principle and the exclusion principle in Defini-
tion 14. According to Wright (2000), various forms of economic oppression can
be categorized into the following two notions: exploitation and non-exploitative
economic oppression.
In non-exploitative oppression, the advantaged group does not itself need the
excluded group. Although the welfare of the advantaged does depend on the
exclusion principle, there is no ongoing interdependence between their activities
and those of the disadvantaged. However, in exploitation, exploiters depend
upon the effort of the exploited for their own welfare. Hence, exploiters depend
upon and need the exploited.
We can find a sharp contrast between these two notions by considering
the difference in the treatment of indigenous people in North America (non-
exploitative economic oppression) and South Africa (exploitation) by European
settlers. First, in both cases, we can find a causal relationship between the ma-
terial advantage to the settlers and the material disadvantage to the indigenous
people. This fact implies that both cases satisfy the inverse interdependence wel-
fare principle. Second, in both cases, this causal relation is rooted in processes
by which indigenous people were excluded from a crucial productive resource,
namely land. Hence, both cases satisfy the exclusion principle.
However, in South Africa, the settlers appropriated the fruits of labor of
the indigenous population, first as agricultural labor and later as mine workers.
This finding implies that the relation between the settlers and indigenous people
in South Africa was exploitative.
By contrast, in North America, the labor effort of the indigenous people
was generally not appropriated. The indigenous people were simply excluded
from the capitalistic economic activities developed by the settlers. This finding
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implies that the settlers in North America could adopt a strategy of genocide in
response to the conflict generated by this exclusion, because they did not need
the labor effort of Native Americans. Thus, the relation between the settlers and
indigenous people in North America is an example of non-exploitative economic
oppression.
5 Recent developments of exploitation theory in
economics: an axiomatic approach
According to Cohen (1995), Vrousalis (2013), and Wright (2000), exploitation
should be conceptualized as the systematic structure of economic transactions,
in which some of the fruits of the labor of the exploited agents is appropriated by
the exploiters under the institutional framework of asymmetric power relations
resulting from private ownership. Thus, while the UE theory of exploitation
is conceptually sophisticated and well motivated by these works, the issue of
proper formal definitions of UE exploitation has yet remained unresolved, as we
saw in section 2.
Note that if a definition of UE exploitation is appropriate, it should point
out the existence of a transfer mechanism by which UE is mediated: UE occurs
by a mechanism that transfers (a part of) the productive fruits of the exploited
to the exploiter. In perfectly competitive markets, neglecting the issue of rent,
net outputs are distributed into wage income and profit income. Moreover,
every party receives an equal wage per unit of (effective) labor. Therefore, the
appropriation of more of the productive fruits by exploiters must be explained
as a source of income other than wages, that is, profits. In other words, a valid
formal definition of UE exploitation should be able to verify the correspondence
between UE and profits.
Summarizing the above argument leads to the following logical implication
as our desideratum:
(a) The formal definition of UE exploitation is valid ⇒ (b) in any economic
equilibrium, the generation of positive profits must imply a UE transfer from
each propertyless worker and vice versa, according to the presumed definition
of exploitation.
Statement (b) is referred to as the Profit-Exploitation Correspondence
Principle (PECP).
The PECP looks similar to the FMT, but they are both conceptually and
formally different. Conceptually, the FMT, in general, refers to the (average)
rate of exploitation (i.e., the rate of surplus value) for the working class as a
whole.26 By contrast, the PECP requires equivalence between the generation
26As shown by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2012), in a von Neumann economy with the
heterogeneity of propertyless workers’ welfare functions, the positivity of the average rate
of exploitation may coexist with the non-exploitation of some propertyless workers, simply
because of their consumption choices. This fact implies that even if the FMT holds in such
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of positive profits and situation in which each propertyless worker is identified
as exploited, for any capitalist economy. Formally, the PECP and the FMT are
logically independent, as discussed below.
Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015a) axiomatically characterize the definitions
of UE exploitation that satisfy the PECP, shedding new light on the debate
about the proper definition of UE exploitation. Firstly, they propose a general
model of capitalist economies that allows for heterogeneity in each agent’s pref-
erences for consumption goods and leisure, heterogeneity in their endowments
of material and human capital, and a general closed-convex cone type of produc-
tion set. Secondly, given such a general model, they axiomatically characterize
the formal definitions of UE exploitation in which the PECP is preserved in any
equilibrium. As a result, few definitions of exploitation proposed in the liter-
ature preserve the PECP, with only the definition à la the New Interpretation
(Duménil, 1980; Foley, 1982) being an exception.
5.1 Alternative definitions of exploitation and the domain
axiom of admissible definitions of exploitation
Recall that the model of capitalist economies considered in sections 2.1 and
2.2.2 assumes no difference in agents’ labor skills or preferences for leisure. In
this section, we assume a more general model of a capitalist economy, E =­
N ;P(A,B,L); (u
ν , sν ,ων0)ν∈N
®
, that includes the heterogeneity of labor skills and
preferences for consumption bundles and leisure. Here, we discuss the axiom
proposed by Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015a), which represents the minimal
necessary condition for admissible definitions of UE exploitation. Then, we
introduce alternative definitions of exploitation proposed in the literature on
mathematical Marxian economics.
As a preliminary step, given any P , we define the set of production activities
feasible with k units of labor inputs by P (αl = k) ≡ {(−α0l,−α0,α0) ∈ P | α0l = k}.
Moreover, given c ∈ Rn+, we define the set of efficient production activities to pro-
duce c as a net output by ∂φ (c) ≡ {α ∈ φ (c) | ∀α0 ∈ φ (c) , (−α0l > −αl ⇒ ∃i : −α0i 5 −αi < 0)}.27
Any definition of exploitation should be able to identify, associated with
each equilibrium allocation, the set of exploiting agents, N ter ⊆ N , and the set
of exploited agents, N ted ⊆ N , such that N ter ∩ N ted = ∅ holds. Moreover,
it should capture the feature of UE as the difference between the amount of
labor supplied by each agent and the amount of labor “received” through each
agent’s income. In particular, the supplied labor amount should be greater than
the received labor amount for each exploited agent. Such properties should be
preserved as a core feature of exploitation regardless of the way in which UE
exploitation is measured.
Note that for the capitalist economies considered herein, each agent’s supply
of labor is identified by Λν . By contrast, how to formulate the labor amount
economies, it may be that some propertyless workers are not exploited.
27By this definition, for the frontier of the production possibility set P , ∂P ≡
{α ∈ P | @α0 ∈ P : α0 > α}, we have ∂φ (c) ⊆ ∂P ∩ {α ∈ φ (c) | α ≯ c}.
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that each agent can “receive” through his/her earned income remains open to
debate. Based on the forms of “received” labor, a number of possible definitions
of exploitation exist.
Summarizing the above arguments, Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015a) propose
an axiom that represents the minimal necessary condition for any definition of
exploitation, whenever it is deemed to be admissible as the form of UE:
Labor Exploitation (LE) (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a): Given any defini-
tion of exploitation, for any capitalist economy E and any RS
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
,
the set of exploited agents, N ted ⊆ N , should have the following property: there
exists a profile of commodity bundles, (cνe )ν∈W ∈ RnW+ , such that, for any
ν ∈W, pcνe = wΛν holds, and for some production point, αc
ν
e ∈ ∂φ (cνe ):
ν ∈ N ted ⇔ αc
ν
e
l < Λν .
That is, axiom LE requires that any admissible definition of UE exploitation
must identify whether each propertyless agent is exploited for each RS under
any economy. More specifically, the axiom stipulates that the set of propertyless
exploited agents be identified as follows: according to each specific admissible
definition, there should be a profile, (cνe)ν∈W , for each propertyless agent’s com-
modity bundle affordable by that agent’s revenue, and its corresponding profile¡
αcνe
¢
ν∈W of production activities, where each α
cνe can produce the correspond-
ing commodity bundle cνe as a net output in a technologically efficient way.
Then, the exploitation status of each propertyless agent can be identified by
comparing his/her amount of labor supply Λν with the amount of labor input
αc
ν
e
l that he/she is able to “receive” through his/her income wΛν .
Axiom LE is a rather weak condition in that it only refers to the exploitation
status of propertyless agents in each RS. This should be reasonable as a minimal
necessary condition for the admissible domain. In other words, a definition of
exploitation is not necessarily deemed to be proper, even if it satisfies LE. In
fact, there may be infinitely many definitions of exploitation that satisfy LE,
and all the main definitions proposed in the mathematical Marxian economics
literature satisfy this axiom.28
To see the last point, let us consider three main definitions under general
economies with possibly heterogeneous agents. First, the following two defini-
tions are respectively natural extensions of Definitions 4 and 10 to economies
with possibly heterogeneous agents:
Definition 15 (Morishima, 1974): For any capitalist economy, E, and any
ν ∈ W, who supplies Λν and purchases cν ∈ Rn+ , ν ∈ N ted if and only if
Λν > minα∈φ(cν) αl.
28Of course, this does not imply that the axiom LE is trivial. For instance, the definition
proposed by Matsuo (2008) does not satisfy LE.
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Definition 16 (Roemer, 1982, chapter 5): For any capitalist economy, E, any
RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, and any ν ∈W, who supplies Λν and purchases
cν ∈ Rn+ , ν ∈ N ted if and only if Λν > minα∈φ(cν ;p,w) αl.
Finally, for any capitalist economy, E , and any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
,
let αp,w ≡Pν∈N αν . Moreover, for any c ∈ Rn+ , we define a non-negative num-
ber, τ c ∈ R+ , as satisfying τ cpbαp,w = pc. Then:
Definition 17 (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a): For any capitalist economy,
E , any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, and any ν ∈ W, who supplies Λν and
can purchase cν ∈ Rn+ , ν ∈ N ted if and only if Λν > τ c
ναp,wl .
In Definition 17, for each ν ∈ W, τ cν represents ν’s share of national income,
and thus τ cναp,wl is the share of social labor that this agent receives through
the wage income sufficient to purchase cν . It is conceptually related to the New
Interpretation (NI) definition of exploitation à la Duménil (1980) and Foley
(1982), which was originally defined in Leontief economies with homogeneous
agents. In the NI, the value of money is defined by the labor amount per unit of
national income,29 and the wage multiplied by the value of money is the value of
labor power, as Foley (1986, p. 43) states: “the amount of average social labor
workers receive a claim to in the wage for each hour they actually work–that
is, as the average wage multiplied by the value of money.” In Definition 7, for
each ν ∈W, τ cναp,wl = wΛν
αp,w
l
pαp,w holds by wΛν = pcν . Since wΛν is ν’s wage
income and
αp,w
l
pαp,w corresponds to the value of money in the NI, Λν > τ c
ναp,wl
means that ν is exploited as “a worker expends more labor hours than he or she
receives an equivalent for in wages” (Foley 1986, p.122).
5.2 Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
Now, we are ready to formulate the axiom of Profit-Exploitation Correspondence
Principle, given as follows:
Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (PECP) [Veneziani and
Yoshihara (2015a)]: For any capitalist economy, E , and any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
:£
pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0⇔ N ted ⊇W+¤ ,
where W+ ≡ {ν ∈W | Λν > 0} 6= ∅.
That is, whatever the definition of exploitation is, it must follow that for any
capitalist economy and any RS, total profits are positive if and only if any prop-
ertyless employee is exploited in terms of this definition, assuming the definition
of exploitation is deemed appropriate. This is required by PECP.
29 In other words, the ratio of aggregate direct labor time to aggregate money value added.
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For the available class of capitalist economies considered here, there is no
requirement of a restriction that excludes the existence of fixed capital goods,
the possibility of joint production, or of technical changes. In addition, unlike
in condition (2) of the RFMT discussed in section 2, there is no restriction that
excludes the existence of a dependently produced commodity. Moreover, hetero-
geneity in agents’ preferences and/or skills is also permitted. The equilibrium
notion presumed here is also sufficiently general that there is no requirement
of a subsistence wage condition. Therefore, the correspondence between profits
and exploitation is required for a large class of economies, as assumed by the
standard general equilibrium theory.
However, PECP per se is not so strong. Indeed, it even allows for a situation
in which some propertyless employees are exploited in an equilibrium with zero
total profit.30 This finding implies that, at least within the class of economies
with homogeneous agents, PECP is logically weaker than the statement of the
FMT, as within such economies, the latter implies that no propertyless employee
is exploited in any equilibrium with zero profit. By contrast, while the FMT
implies that the rate of exploitation for the whole working class is positive in any
equilibrium with positive total profits, PECP requests that every propertyless
worker is exploited, which is a stronger claim than that of the FMT.
As noted at the start of this section, if a definition of exploitation satisfying
axiom LE is proper, it must satisfy PECP. Based on this perspective, Veneziani
and Yoshihara (2015a) study the necessary and sufficient condition for PECP,
as stated in the following theorem:31
Theorem 1 (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a): For any definition of exploitation
satisfying LE, the following two statements are equivalent for any capitalist
economy, E , and any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
:
(1) PECP holds under this definition of exploitation;
(2) If pbαp,w−wαp,wl > 0, then for any ν ∈W+, there exists a production activity
ανπ ∈ P (αl = Λν) ∩ ∂P such that bανπ ∈ Rn+, pbανπ > wΛν , and (ανπl,ανπ,ανπ) =
ην
³
αc
ν
e
l ,αc
ν
e ,αcνe
´
hold for some ην > 1.
That is, condition (2) of Theorem 1 is the necessary and sufficient condition for
any definition of exploitation satisfying LE to preserve PECP. Condition (2)
states that if total profits are positive in the present equilibrium, then for each
propertyless employee, ν ∈W+, there exists a suitable efficient production point,
ανπ, activated by the present amount of labor supply, Λν , which in conjunction
with production activity, αcνe , can verify that this agent is being exploited.
Recall that, according to axiom LE, production activity αcνe is identified by
the presumed definition of exploitation, and the corresponding labor input αc
ν
e
l
30However, any definition of exploitation satisfying LE does not allow the existence of
exploited propertyless employees in conjunction with zero profit.
31Note that, though all of the following analyses herein presume economies with a homo-
geneous type of labor with heterogeneous levels of skills, the completely parallel results can
be obtained even if we consider economies with heterogeneous types of labor, as shown in
Veneziani and Yoshihara (2014).
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represents agent ν’s “received” labor. Production activity ανπ ∈ P (αl = Λν) ∩
∂P is defined as the proportional expansion of production point αcνe up to the
point of his/her present labor supply, Λν , and that produces a non-negative net
output, bανπ ∈ Rn+, that is non-affordable by ν at the present equilibrium because
pbανπ > wΛν . Therefore, since Λν = ανπl > αcνel holds for such a selection of ανπ,
we can confirm that agent ν ∈ W+ is exploited at this RS, according to the
given definition satisfying LE.
Theorem 1 does not provide a normative characterization of the presumed
definition of exploitation, but rather a demarcation line (condition (2)) by which
one can test which of infinitely many potential definitions preserves the essential
relation of exploitation and profits in capitalist economies. Thus, if a definition
of exploitation satisfying LE does not generally meet condition (2), then it
will not satisfy PECP, which implies that it is not a proper definition of UE
exploitation.
Some may criticize the methodological positions of PECP and Theorem 1,
claiming that PECP should be proved as a theorem rather than treated as an
axiom. In fact, as Okishio and Morishima did, the methodological standpoint
of the FMT was, assuming a specific definition of exploitation, to verify that a
capitalist economy can be conceived of as exploitative.
By contrast, Theorem 1 presumes a correspondence between positive profits
and exploitation for every propertyless employee as an axiom and then tests the
validity of each alternative definition of UE exploitation by checking whether
it satisfies this axiom. Such a methodology has been implicitly adopted within
debates on the FMT. Typically, whenever a counterexample has been raised
against the FMT with a major definition of exploitation by generalizing the
model of economies, this criticism has been resolved by proposing an alternative
definition and proving that the FMT is held with this alternative form under
the generalized economic model. This implicitly suggests that in the overall
debate on the FMT, the validity of each form of exploitation has been tested
by the robustness of the equivalence between exploitation and positive profits.
However, even if such an interpretation is acceptable, the structure of the debate
on the FMT could not function as such, because it may involve an infinite
repetition of counterexample and alternate proposal. By contrast, by providing
an axiomatic characterization such as Theorem 1, the validity of every form of
UE exploitation is testable simply by checking condition (2).
Another argument justifies the treatment of PECP as an axiom. In any
Leontief economy, regardless of whether agents are heterogeneous in preferences
and/or skill levels, the equivalence of positive profits and exploitation of each
propertyless employee and the equivalence of zero profit and no exploitation are
preserved for any definition of exploitation, as long as it satisfies LE.
Theorem 2 (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a): For any capitalist economy,­
N ;P(A,L); (u
ν , sν ,ων0)ν∈N
®
, and any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, PECP
holds for any definition of exploitation satisfying LE.
Proof. Take any definition of exploitation that satisfies LE. Then, for any Leon-
30
tief economy and any RS, (p,w), we can find a profile of reference commodity
bundles, (cνe )ν∈W ∈ RnW+ . Then, regardless of the heterogeneity of welfare func-
tions and skills, the corresponding profile of production activities,
¡
αcνe
¢
ν∈W , is
uniquely given by
αcνe ≡
³
−vcνe ,−A (I −A)−1 cνe ,
h
I +A (I −A)−1
i
cνe
´
for each ν ∈W.
Thus, αc
ν
e
l = vc
ν
e . Let pbαp,w −wαp,wl > 0 for this RS. This finding implies that,
under the Leontief economy
p = (1 + π) pA+ wL for some π > 0.
Then, as is well known, p
w
> v. Thus, by wΛν = pcνe from LE, we have
Λν = p
w
cνe > vc
ν
e , for any ν ∈W+. Therefore, according to LE, any propertyless
employee is exploited in terms of the presumed definition of exploitation.
However, once the production technology of economies is replaced by a more
general type such as the von Neumann production technology, some definitions
of exploitation violatePECP, even if they satisfy LE. Does this suggest that the
validity of the basic Marxian perception of capitalist economies as exploitative
crucially depends on the degree of the complexity of the production technology?
Or, does it suggest that such counterexamples are generated because of the
incoherency of these definitions in that they cannot properly identify the set of
exploited agents whenever a more complex production technology is applied?
Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015a) take the latter view. For the complexity of
production technology such as the existence of fixed capital and of alternative
techniques should not be essential for the exploitation status of each agent.
Rather, these counterexamples should be viewed as representing the non-validity
of the presumed definitions of exploitation.
Theorem 4 does not identify a unique definition that meets PECP, but
rather a class of definitions that satisfy condition (2). Yet, Veneziani and Yoshi-
hara (2015a, Corollary 1) show that it has surprising implications concerning
the main approaches in exploitation theory. There are economies in which, for
all ν ∈W+, condition (2) is never satisfied if αc
ν
e is given by Definition 15 or 16,
and thus PECP does not hold. By contrast, Definition 17 satisfies condition
(2), and thus PECP holds for all E and all RS:
Corollary 1 (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a): There exists a capitalist econ-
omy, E , and an RS for this economy such that neither Definition 15 nor Defini-
tion 16 satisfies PECP.
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in section 2.2.2 by using the economy in
Example 1. In that economy, assume an RS (p∗, 1) with p∗1 > 0. Then, every
agent, ν ∈ W+, consumes cν = b and minα∈φ(cν) αl = minα∈φ(cν ;p∗,1) αl = 1 =
Λ∗ν , while π∗ > 0. This finding implies that neither Definition 15 nor Definition
16 satisfies PECP.
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Corollary 2 (Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2015a): For any capitalist economy, E ,
and any RS, Definition 17 satisfies PECP.
These corollaries suggest that, at least among the main competing proposals of
exploitation forms, Definition 17 is the sole appropriate form.
The above arguments are sufficient to show that among the main proposals
in the literature, the NI one is the only definition of UE exploitation that can be
used to measure UE coherently regardless of the complexity of production tech-
nology. However, other arguments also support the NI form of UE exploitation.
First, following Roemer’s (1982) view on the epistemological role of the CECP,
Yoshihara (2010) formulates Class-Exploitation Correspondence Princi-
ple (CECP) as an axiom that any proper definition of exploitation should meet
and then shows that the NI definition is the unique one satisfying this axiom
among the main definitions. This is even more supportive for the NI definition
since CECP may provide a more comprehensive view of capitalist exploitative
relations than PECP. Second, Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) introduce an
axiom called Relational Exploitation (RE) that requests that an exploiter
exists if and only if an exploited agent exists as a minimal condition to capture
the social relational feature of exploitation. Then, they show that any definition
satisfying RE, together with a small number of rather weak axioms, is uniquely
the NI definition.
Another interesting argument supports the NI definition. Although Defi-
nition 17 formulates exploitation as the unequal exchange of labor, it is also
possible to formulate the unequal exchange of any commodity, k, in an analogi-
cal way. In this case, is an argument such as the GCET re-established by using
such a definition of unequal exchange? The answer is negative, according to
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2013).
Let us define exploitative relations as an unequal exchange of commodity k,
analogical to Definition 17:
Definition 18 (Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2013): For any capitalist economy,
E , and any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, any agent, ν ∈ N , supplies some
amount of commodity k, ωνk = 0, as a factor of production, and consumes
cν ∈ Rn+ . Then, agent ν is k-exploited if and only if ωνk > τ c
ναp,wk .
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2013) prove that the equivalence between posi-
tive profits and existence of k-exploited agents in terms of Definition 18 does
not hold. For instance, assuming an economy with a homogeneity of welfare
functions and labor skills, consider an RS with zero profit. Then, it follows
that, for any ν ∈ N , τ cν = 1
N
. By contrast, whenever the initial endowment of
capital good k is unequal, there generically exists an agent, ν0, endowed with
ων0k > 1Nωk. Then, it is easy to construct an equilibrium with zero profit under
which this agent is deemed to be k-exploited, which violates the equivalence of
k-exploitation with positive profits in terms of Definition 18.
Summarizing these arguments, if we take the NI definition such as in Defini-
tion 17, it follows that the unequal exchange of any productive factor other than
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labor and UE are not logically equivalent. Therefore, there can be no room for
criticism of this definition by means of an analogical argument of the GCET,
unlike the criticism of Okishio—Morishima’s definition.
6 Concluding remarks
One of the most prominent contributions of Okishio (1963) is that he inspired
the controversy about the proper definitions of exploitation. Although Okishio’s
definition of exploitation (Definition 2 in this paper) was essentially faithful to
the labor theory of value and theory of surplus value, the sequence of later
controversies suggests the limitation and noneligibility of such a classical defini-
tion. Instead, based on the axiomatic analysis reviewed in section 5, the NI type
(Definition 17 in this paper) is deemed to be appropriate as a coherent mea-
sure of UE exploitation applicable to a broader class of economies with complex
structures of production and the heterogeneity of agents.
Moreover, Definition 17 also satisfies a property of Minimal objectivism
(Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2011) in that, unlike Definitions 15 and 16, the
exploitation status of agents is determined independent of possibly arbitrary
consumption decisions. Further, it has a clear empirical content by being firmly
anchored to actual economic data: only actual production decisions and the
social allocation of labor, income, and production activities matter.
Recent discussions such as Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000), through the
debate over Roemer’s (1982, 1994) PR exploitation theory, conceptualize UE
exploitation as UE transfer under the systematic asymmetric power structure
due to private ownership, by which UE exploitation is shown to be irreducible to
the issue of distributive injustice. Indeed, the issue of UE exploitation refers to
the asymmetric structure of production relations among citizens with capacity.
The UE feature can be criticized from a viewpoint of distributive justice, but it
is simply one aspect of injustice involved in exploitative production relations.
Contemporary theories of distributive justice typically refer primarily to the
treatment of citizens who suffer disadvantages in access to suitable labor markets
due to bad luck, incapacity, disability, or their social background. These citizens
might be deemed to be economically oppressed but not exploited, according to
Wright’s (2000) terminology.
By contrast, the issue of working poor, which has even affected regular work-
ers in advanced countries during recent decades, is more relevant to the issue of
UE exploitation, since it is not simply a matter of the insufficiency of welfare
compensation, but is more related to the power relations between capital and
labor and the strength of labor unions. Note that this issue also suggests that
addressing a special concern to propertyless employees is still important in UE
exploitation theory, as, for instance, more than 30% of current households in
Japan lack financial assets.
Overall, UE exploitation theory and theories of distributive justice play mu-
tually complementary roles in diagnosing the present society; one does not dom-
inate the other and nor are they mutually exclusive and substitutable. This find-
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ing suggests that in some contexts, the issues of redressing distributive injustice
and of improving exploitative working conditions might be traded off, given the
scarce budgets of the welfare state. In such a situation, it would be necessary
to develop a theory of comprehensive social welfare functions to accommodate
the criteria of distributive justice and of UE exploitation, in addition to the
standard criterion of economic efficiency.
In this respect, UE exploitation theory has not thus far been sufficiently
cultivated; it can only identify the proper measure to diagnose the existence of
UE exploitation. The next step to develop UE exploitation theory would be
to study the severity of UE exploitation in each society. Proceeding with this
line of research would require a new subject to identify a proper measure of the
degree of UE exploitation.
Definition 17 in this paper also suggests that non-exploitative resource allo-
cations should serve as the proportional solution, as proposed by Roemer and
Silvestre (1993). Although reducing concerns about exploitation to concerns
about distributive injustice is not legitimate, it is still an intrinsically interest-
ing problem to study the ethical properties of non-exploitative allocations. With
regard to this point, Roemer (2010, 2015) recently shows that the proportional
solution, that is, the allocation rule of non-exploitation, would be implementable
in a moral state of society in which every citizen behaves in accordance with the
Kantian categorical imperative. Such a moral state of society is formulated by
Roemer (2010) as a social state of the Kantian equilibrium. This line of research
would be interesting for Marxian economists to study further.
Lastly, this paper mainly discussed the generation of UE exploitation in a
perfectly competitive economy. However, we have not addressed the persistency
of exploitative relations32 nor the generation of exploitative relations under cap-
italist economies with imperfect labor contracts.33 The former problem would
be relevant, in a broader sense, to the controversies over the Okishio Theorem
(Okishio, 1961), another significant contribution by Nobuo Okishio. We leave
this point to future research.
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